Jarmila Rajas presents in her article that 'state feminism', behind the façade of integration, uses 'pastoral power' to construct immigrant women into the same as men, particularly by stressing the importance of employment. Deriving from Foucaultian governmentality blended with radical feminist underpinnings she leans on postpolitical outlooks stressing the subjective role of 'identities' and claims that the obsessive view of gender equality as sameness is preventing immigrant women to be what they 'really' want, ostensibly something different from westernised idea of 'unisex' citizens. In addition to the subjective advocacy of immigrant women's 'rights', the article's main message revolves around an assertion that feminism in Scandinavia is not sufficient or suitable. My critique here focuses mainly on theoretical and normative aspects, but some points in relation to Rajas' reading of 'empirical' discourses are also made.
as well. This is particularly pernicious for those whose engagement with the society is perhaps still wavering in general -immigrants. In addition to compounding irrelevance of political action at large, the view presented in the article also freezes possibilities for progress, as there is no difference between internal and external realms of identity. An endless list of needs for recognition and 'autonomy' ensures that discourses evolve and interact in a normative arena filled with moral rights claims but no politics whatsoever to hold them up (see Furedi 2011) . Detaching 'immigrant women' from the category of 'immigrants' is a method of constructing again a new object of depoliticised unit of 'human beings'. Breaking the link between referents and the political level leaves individuals flowing in the air, free to be retrieved and labelled by any political argument or interest, supported by state feminists, multiculturalists or academics. But individual is a rights-bearing subject only as a participant and a member of his/her society (e.g. Chandler 2009). 'Immigrant women' cannot be removed from the domain of their new community. Outsourcing progress to individuals is at best idealistic, at worst immoral.
Grading the road for equal opportunities is for the benefit of both individuals and the society. Equality in Finland is based on a liberal idea of autonomy and freedom, both in positive and negative forms. This is fundamentally different from both moderate feminist discourses on sameness and radical dogmatic discourses on 'difference'. Hence, as a rationale of the society, it is the equality of rights-bearing subjects that should inform both theoretical aspects of immigration and involvement of the state. There are no feminist structures without state interventions, no woman-friendly achievements without strong societies. The opposite usually holds -and that is why many immigrants often lack ideas of embedded 'equality' as valued in our societies. Equality is not a universally existent commodity to be consumed from this or that 'identity' perspective, but a result of spatial and temporal social and political struggle, worth the effort of support and promotion.
Without any solid ground where to stand -no state feminism, no integration motives, no directives for favourable engagement in and with the society -the most intimate threat we can encounter is ending up being essentialised, as 'immigrants', 'immigrant women', or simply 'women', which is also Rajas' concern. Similarly, immigration politics turns out to be a contest over popularised meanings, tuning of concepts and responding to various moral emergencies caused by different actors. Any deeper ideas about human mobility, multiculturalism or immigration policies turn irrelevant. Presenting one's intentions at the realm of subjective moral claims seems more relevant than scrutinising political, societal, social or international bases of these claims. The perspective is incapable of seeing past historical processes and events as constitutive and meaningful -and lacks a reasonable perception of the future as well. In this vein, we are perfectly confident to judge if some policy is emancipatory or pastoral and if some actors of the society are morally legitimate or not. Stimuli are already there, there is no need for politics. It is here, where Rajas' critique towards dominating state structures and essentialisations of gender and culture will evidently navigate us.
What Rajas seems to suggest is a kind of 'laissez-faire' of integration: let 'them' decide what equality is, according to their 'identities'. If 'immigrant women' are as free as maintained in the article, they are certainly able to pierce the lines of state feminism's hegemony as well and argue for their own existence and aspirations. Should we then trust blindly to avoid the dis-empowering trap of using 'pastoral power'? In the meantime, multiculturalism as a practice, not perhaps as an ideal, continues its crisis partly due to the fact that liberal, The difference is whether gender equality is a value or whether it is used as a disciplinary technology (Cruikshank 1999). I do not agree with Purra's vision of equality signifying making people equal. This problematisation is created by making immigrant women a priori unequal, by subjectifying them as not interested in reaping these benefits and then demanding that they reap these benefits. This problematisation focuses attention on issues that are quite marginal to the problems of immigrant women's employment and integration.
What is at stake is the legitimacy of criticising liberalism. Liberal normative discourses are capable of going astray. There is a difference between contemplation of god's will and the actions taken in god's name, so to say. Purra's objection relates to the old problem between liberal and post-structuralist thinking around normativity in which liberal thinkers think that criticising liberalism constitutes moral relativism and at worse nihilism, the modern equivalent of heresy.
If religious thinkers are able to discuss and debate religious truths, it should not be so difficult for liberal thinkers to allow some room for self-examination -even about the use of culturalising discourses and technologies of improvement around the immigrant woman.
For if we part from the point that the state can positively enhance the integration of immigrants, it does not necessarily follow that it is the state's duty to make the immigrant the same as the rest or that the state should control immigrants' 'ideational horizons'. In my understanding, pluralism and freedom of thought was integral to liberalism. Regarding this evident contradiction, Foucaultian thinkers have pointed out that liberal governmentality allows for a certain degree of despotism when the aim is the improvement of the citizens, the reform and re-education of their habits, thoughts and desires (Valverde 1996: 362; Dean 2010) . This despotism of the Will to Improve is at the heart of the disciplinary technology of modernity designed to foster citizens wanting to conduct their own conduct in ways beneficial to the health and wealth of society. This is the source of the resistance to the rationality of making live; the impetus to improve that recognises few limits and eats away even at such supposed liberal values of freedom of choice and thought (whether executed through the state or through the civil society).
I also disagree with the assertion that the economic rationale behind the immigrant women's employment overpowers the freedom to choose a single-income family model. Equal opportunity is not the same as the duty to utilise opportunities. The impetus of having women participate equally in the labour market is not a matter of gender equality but of economic wealth, with this I agree with Purra.
Fundamentally then it is a value choice that the 'ubiquitous neoliberal Purra's assertion that equality fundamentally relies on sameness and that this is a result of progress explains itself under the narrow, economic conceptualisation of politics. But equality cannot be reduced to resources. Certainly resources are fundamental, but equality remains fundamentally hollow if not combined with treating people with equality (which is free, by the way). Thus, we are at the heart of the problem. Purra thinks equality is to be earned by acting in certain ways, by making certain value choices beneficial to the (host) society regardless of circumstances. I think there is a difference between earning resource equality and giving immigrant women agency without resorting to essentialising discourses of culture. At the heart of this issue is the trope of 'progress' that underlines the Will to Improve. 'Progress' is flaunted as a self-explaining concept that mysteriously applies to the direction that politics should take, but which fundamentally is an empty signifier void of (politically!) agreeable meaning. Akin to the use of economics, the trope of 'Progress' is used to freeze politics, to discipline and to mark as threat those assigned as endangering it. Thus, rather than approach this problem through discourses about improving 'cultural backwardness threatening the Progressive notion of equality', we should heed the warning of the last time we started analysing economic problems according to a racialising logic. For solving the economic crisis we do not need a race theory about the 'immigrants' unwillingness to work' but a critical economic theory. For solving the problems of immigrant integration we need to look at structural discrimination instead of perpetuating it. Instead of willing the immigrants to improve, we need to look at the ubiquitous, common sense race theories in light of which the 'culturally different', i.e. 'non-white', immigrant cannot be the Same.
